Canadian Safety Reporter

5 Canadian HR Reporter, a Thomson Reuters business 2018 News | February 2018 | CSR Ontario company cleared of charges following fatal accident Process leading to accident had no accepted standard but company exercised due diligence in providing regular safety meetings and safety equipment BY JEFFREY R. SMITH AN ONTARIO worker's fatal ac- cident was caused by the work- er's unforeseeable failure to fol- low established procedure, not his employer's failure to ensure he was knowledgable and had the proper equipment, the On- tario Court of Justice has ruled. Cobra Float Services is a transporter of heavy construc- tion equipment based in Con- cord, Ont., having been in busi- ness for 30 years. In May 2013, Cobra Float was under contract to deliver a curb making ma- chine to a subdivision being built in Brampton, Ont. The curb machine was loaded onto a flat- bed truck and float trailer and transported to the construction site by Cobra Float employee Luis Pinto on his own. How- ever, while Pinto was unloading the machine, it tipped over onto Pinto, pinning him under it. He later died of his injuries. The Ontario Ministry of La- bour launched an investigation into the accident. There were no witnesses, so investigators had to piece together what happened based on the evidence at the site. The curb machine had an off- set wheel that sat between two regularly placed wheels and the trailer used to transport it at a space between the two regular wheels that allowed the trailer to be raised and attached to a truck. However, the trailer didn't have a ramp across the width of the trailer that could accommo- date the offset wheel, just two separate ramps about 30 inches apart to drive the machine off the trailer. The investigation revealed that curb machines are tricky to offload from a trailer because of the offset wheel in the middle of the machine. Since this wheel can't travel on one of the trailer's ramps, it was common prac- tice to lower the machine to its lowest position. However, the curb machine in question had a wood form attached to its body that required it to be elevated higher to clear the ramp. It was also common practice to use a large piece of wood in the gap between the wheels to support the offset wheel during load- ing and unloading. Cobra Float didn't always provide workers with such a piece of wood but all of them had some. There were pieces of wood on the trailer, but no evidence Pinto had placed it into the gap before the accident — none were seen between or near the ramps. Cobra Float indicated that it provided equipment such as chains and binders to secure machinery to trailers and pieces of wood to use as ramps in load- ing and unloading equipment, and drivers were responsible for maintaining the safety equip- ment and ensuring it was avail- able when needed. The curb machine's owner's manual stated that the machine should not be moved when el- evated more than 12 inches, but it would have had to have been raised at least 13 inches because of the wood form attached to its body. The investigators dis- covered Pinto and other Cobra Float workers had not seen the manual, but the company stated that Pinto was experienced and knew what to do — he had pre- viously worked for two other float companies for several years and was considered "one of the best" drivers the company had. It reported that he had moved a curb machine 27 times previ- ously, and Cobra Float workers had moved such a machine on 66 other occasions. During the investigation, measurements were taken that showed the curb machine was 22 inches off the ground, which would have made it more sus- ceptible to tipping. In addition, the elevation controls were set to "auto" rather than "manual," which would decrease the sta- bility of the machine. A ministry engineer estimated that the off- set tire fell into the gap between the two ramps while it was being driven off the trailer, causing it to tip over. The engineer also felt the float trailer used wasn't ade- quate for loading and unloading a curb machine. Cobra Float didn't formally train Pinto and the approximate- ly 12 other drivers because they all had previous experience or acquired "hands on experience," but it held safety meetings every three to four months as well as informal discussions among the drivers. The company had a safe- ty and compliance consultant who ensured compliance with the Ministry of Transportation and the Ontario Highway Traf- fic Act, but didn't oversee com- pliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Worker > pg. 8 Credit: Shutterstock/Darryl Brooks

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