Canadian Safety Reporter - sample

5 Canadian HR Reporter, a Thomson Reuters business 2018 News | May 2018 | CSR Workplace accident result of insufficient training, not violation Worker had previous safety violations, but neither he nor co-worker were trained on what to do in specific circumstances that led to railyard collision BY JEFFREY R. SMITH A BRITISH Columbia employee who was fired in the wake of a rail car mishap leading to a de- railment is not responsible due to a lack of proper safety train- ing, the B.C. Supreme Court has ruled. Richard Tymko, 54, worked as a switchman and trackmobile operator for 4-D Warner En- terprises, a transportation and heavy equipment company. 4-D had a contract with the MacKen- zie Pulp Mill in MacKenzie, B.C., to move rail cars along the mill's internal rail lines, and Tymko's job involved moving those rail cars. When working as a track- mobile operator — trackmo- biles are small locomotives that power the movement of railway cars and commodities in a rail- way yard — he was responsible for the forward and backward movement of the trackmobile and using the brake system. As a switchman, he was responsible for ensuring rail crossings were clear, ensuring brakes were ap- plied on rail cars, and monitor- ing the movement and direction of trains. When a trackmobile is mov- ing, both the switchman and operator are responsible for stopping it. The operator is in charge of the brakes and the switchman — located near the back of the train — advises when it's time to apply them. Accord- ing to standard procedure, the operator can't move the track- mobile without the switchman advising that the track is clear and where to go. When a train is moving, the procedure is for the switchman to call car lengths be- fore the stopping point over the radio, starting at three cars, then two, then one, then one-half. If the operator doesn't hear the switchman counting car lengths, he's required to stop the train immediately. The switchman also operates switches that allow railway cars to move from one track to another. The MacKenzie Pulp Mill's rail operation rules and its gen- eral operating instructions both outline the stopping procedure for trains and employees were required to be familiar with them to do their jobs safely and efficiently. 4-D gave employ- ees manuals to read and new employees started on a buddy system with a more experi- enced employee, until the more experienced employee advised they could do the job safely. Employees were not trained on signalling procedures or safety protocols in the event of a radio failure between the switchman and the trackmobile operator, as the radios were supplied by the pulp mill. Tymko joined 4-D in Novem- ber 2012 and received what he referred to as "limited training" on the switchman job. He said no one told him to read training materials, but he found them in the desk of the trailer where the crew has coffee, which he re- viewed on his own. In April 2014 he attended a one-day seminar on trackmobile operating. As per company procedure, Tymko was paired with a switch- man to train — he didn't do any switching himself until he was deemed ready. He also attended at least five company safety meet- ings and was observed during his training to determine proficien- cies and deficiencies. By August 2015, his on-the-job training for switchman was deemed com- plete and he was able to work as a switchman himself. 4-D had a progressive dis- cipline policy in place that in- volved a verbal warning for a first infraction, a written warn- ing for a second, and termina- tion for a third. However, certain instances of serious misconduct could lead to termination, and safety violations could result in suspension and up to 90 days' probation. Tymko was under the impression the second stage of the discipline policy, the writ- ten warning, was followed by a three-day suspension and then the 90-day probationary period. In the second half of 2017, Tymko's supervisor noted Tym- ko had problems clearing the crossing — a safety issue — and long coffee breaks. He discussed these issues with Tymko casually to outline expectations. Warnings for safety violations Tymko received two formal written warnings related to safe- ty on Dec. 17, 2014 — for fail- ing to put pins in switches after switching — and April 23, 2015 — for failing to set the brakes on rail cars on a storage line. With the latter warning, he was placed on 90 days' probation. Tymko argued he wasn't on the worksite the day of the latter violation, but the brakes had been checked at 4:45 a.m. and they had been set the day before when Tymko was working. Tymko was working as a switchman moving rail cars with a trackmobile on Dec. 28, 2015. The plan was for him and a trackmobile operator to move four railway cars to a particular line and then stop them about six to eight boxcar lengths from the warehouse. The job required a reverse manoeuvre towards the warehouse. As per normal procedure, the operator was in control of the speed and brakes of the train while Tymko was tasked with notifying him when to stop. As the train switched tracks and was reversing towards the warehouse, Tymko began calling out over the radio the car lengths before stopping, with the op- erator repeating each. However, by the time he called out "one," Tymko didn't hear the operator repeat the number. As the train moved past the stopping point, he panicked and tried to reach the operator on the radio, calling for him to "slow down," "stop," and "blast the air." The train didn't slow down and as it ap- proached the warehouse, Tymko jumped off the trackmobile. The train hit the warehouse door and derailed a railway car that was inside. Tymko made sure there were no injuries inside the warehouse and then spoke to the opera- tor. They discovered the hand- held radios they were using had failed. He felt the accident was caused by either the lack of radio communication or operator er- ror, as safety protocol was to stop the train immediately if com- munication was lost between the switchman and the operator. However, operators weren't spe- cifically trained to stop if noth- ing is heard from the switchman until it was added to training in January 2016. Tymko learned of this protocol when he inde- pendently read the manuals he found and assumed the operator was aware of it. They reported the incident to the supervisor, who came to assess the accident site. Tymko asked him why there was no hard-wired radio in the track- mobile and advised the acting Radio > pg. 8 e worker had received two previous formal written warnings for safety infractions, the second accompanied by a 90-day probation.

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